THE APPLICATION OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW TO OVERCOME CONFLICTING
STATE LAWS IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL DISGORGEMENT PROCEEDINGS OF AN
SEC APPOINTED RECEIVER
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Introduction1
In spite of the Erie doctrine, the application of federal common law has survived
to overcome conflicting state laws in diversity actions where a federal law, interest or
function is implicated.2 A federal court’s authority to substantively implement a federal
common law rule over state law is clearest when the party to the action is a federal entity,
namely an agency of the U.S. Government deriving its authority from the Constitution or
some source of federal law.3 Analyzing such authority becomes more difficult in
circumstances where parties to a diversity lawsuit are private citizens (not necessarily
possessing any direct federal authority) seeking to have federal common law adopted to
displace state law. While the application of federal common law in private diversity
actions has been held to be proper by the Supreme Court in certain cases,4 the analysis
and justification for doing so has remained relatively unclear.5
As a result, federal courts are left with limited guidance as to when the application
of federal common law is proper between private parties. Furthermore, a federal court’s
authority to hear disputes among diverse citizens is not limited to actions where the court
derives its jurisdiction from 28 U.S.C § 1332 making analysis in certain situations even
more problematic. Special authority is granted under 28 U.S.C § 1367 to federal courts
for hearing actions which are ancillary or supplemental to a federal court’s original
jurisdiction over cases involving federal claims or federal questions.6 The Supreme
Court has never directly addressed what the proper application of federal common law
should be, or whether application would be proper at all, in the novel situation where a
federal court is exercising ancillary or supplemental jurisdiction between private litigants
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
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It would seem appropriate to allow the substantive application of federal common
law where the federal government is a party to an action in such ancillary proceedings
given the clarity of the Supreme Court’s justification for doing so where the authority of
the governmental agency or entity flows from the Constitution or some federal source of
law whereby the action itself furthers some federal purpose.7 However, it is less certain
whether a rule of federal common law may be applied substantively over state law in
favor of a private litigant in such a proceeding. Surprisingly, this question has been
addressed under the extremely novel and narrow circumstances surrounding the
disgorgement proceedings of SEC appointed receivers appointed to disgorge fraudulent
transfers made as part of multi-jurisdictional Ponzi schemes.8
A fraudulent conveyance action brought before a federal court by a receiver
against an investor who has received fraudulent transfers in the form of “profits” as part
of a Ponzi scheme is not brought under federal law nor is it connected in any way to the
Federal Bankruptcy Code.9 Furthermore, no federal uniform fraudulent conveyance
statute exists under which the receiver may file an action for disgorgement. As a result,
the cause of action against the investor must be brought under the color of state
fraudulent conveyance law.10 Consequently, extraordinary conflicts-of-law issues arise
in these disgorgement proceedings where transfers have been made to investors across
state lines as part of multi-state Ponzi schemes because of the great divergence from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction in fraudulent conveyance law as well as other relevant state
law which may be applicable to the proceeding.11
In such disgorgement proceedings, elaborate, eloquent and well-reasoned
arguments can be made for the application of state law favorable to the Ponzi scheme
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investor through complex and detailed conflicts of law analysis since it is never clear
which state law is applicable when considering the form in which the transfers are made
and to the entity or entities to which the transfers are made.12 Additionally, an investor
investing as a shareholder of an offshore entity can conceivably manipulate state veilpiercing piercing doctrines to thwart disgorgement.13 As a consequence, uniformity of
outcome in such proceedings is lost and the receiver is burdened with choice of law
issues and analysis anew with each subsequent disgorgement action filed against Ponzi
scheme investors from different jurisdictions. This substantially increases the receiver’s
time and cost of litigation and ultimately decreases the total amount of recovered funds
available for distribution to defrauded investors.
It has been directly suggested by the 8th Circuit that a receiver appointed by a
federal court to disgorge fraudulent transfers as part of a Ponzi scheme is serving a
federal interest and function;14 the primary reason being that a federally appointed
receiver serves as a quasi-federal entity (similar to the FDIC) to enforce the Securities
and Exchange Acts by disgorging illegal profits made from violations of the Acts and is
thus simultaneously serving a federal interest and function.15 This proposition supported
the application of a uniform fraudulent conveyance rule under a federal common law
standard in one such ancillary proceeding16 and could conceivably serve as the standard
in the future for other similar ancillary proceedings involving private litigants.
Furthermore, the decision may have broader implications concerning the substantive
application of federal common law over state law in ancillary proceedings.
It is well recognized that the application of federal common law implicates major
constitutional concerns.17 Indeed, a federal court exercising authority to implement
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common law does “engage in interstitial ‘lawmaking,’ as part of the process of
interpreting positive law”18 raising serious separation of powers issues. Federal judgemade law may also have the consequence of impeding upon the autonomy and
independence of states by preempting state law signaling federalism concerns.19
Although the Supreme Court has arguably narrowed the scope of federal common law to
“several well-recognized enclaves,”20 it has done so by “‘simply [listing] areas of law or
categories of cases in which federal common law is permissible’ without providing any
‘underlying rationale other than grandfathering.’”21
It is the purpose of this paper to trace the development of SEC appointed
receiverships in the Ponzi scheme context and analyze whether the analogy made by the
8th Circuit, namely that these receivers are quasi-federal agents serving federal purposes
and functions, can be reconciled with the Erie doctrine. Part I of this paper will give a
general overview of the evolution of federal common law since the Supreme Court’s
decision in Erie. A careful analysis of the development of federal common law in the
post-Erie era reveals that the substantive application of a rule of federal common law
over state law would be met with the least level of objection when two circumstances are
satisfied all of which are directly implicated in the ancillary disgorgement proceeding of
the SEC appointed receiver.
The first scenario is when the party claiming the benefit of the federal common
law rule1 derives their authority directly from either the Constitution or some federal
source of law creating a “uniquely federal interest.” The second circumstance is when
the consequence of not substantively adopting the federal common law formulation over
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In the majority of these cases, this party has either been the Government of the United States or an
executive agency of the U.S. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust; Kimbell Foods; O’Melveny
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state law shatters uniformity in outcome having the ultimate consequence of frustrating
an integral federal purpose of an Act of Congress or some other integral federal policy.
Simultaneously, the frustration of federal purpose must also be the result of a state law’s
conflict with the federal purpose which will either override or will be irrelevant to a
state’s reliance on the displaced law.
When these circumstances are implicated, it is generally the case that traditional
constitutional dangers of substantively applying federal common law are not implicated.
Specifically, this paper will show that the federalism concerns of the Erie doctrine are not
at issue when federal common law is adopted in the disgorgement proceedings of SEC
appointed receivers. However, separation of powers issues (the analysis of which is
conspicuously less developed in the major Supreme Court cases allowing the adoption of
federal common law rules over state law) may be of concern when considering what law
should be adopted as federal judge-made law in ancillary proceedings to displace
conflicting state laws. Nevertheless, it is likely not to a degree significant enough to
allow for the frustration of integral federal functions.
Part II of this paper will show how the 8th Circuits reasoning in Bryan v. Barlett
falls within the scheme enumerated above. First, this part will give a brief overview and
background of Ponzi schemes and the impetus behind appointment of receivers for the
benefit of defrauded investors from such schemes. Secondly, this part will highlight the
conflicts of law issues which arise in ancillary disgorgement proceedings brought by
federally appointed receivers over entities used in multi-state Ponzi schemes.
Furthermore, it will discuss how resolution of these issues can frustrate the receiver’s
ability to recover “false profits” from investors for the benefit of defrauded investors and
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how conflicts analysis can conceivably benefit investors investing as offshore entities
upsetting the receiver’s recovery efforts. This portion of Part II will primarily discuss
how the facts of a multinational Ponzi scheme led a Federal District Court in the Western
District of Virginia exercising ancillary jurisdiction to adopt the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfers Act (UFTA) as federal common law using the 8th Circuits rationale.
Part III concludes.

I.

Background of Federal Common Law
Though Justice Brandeis famously asserted in Erie v. Tompkins, “[t]here is no

federal general common law,”22 the decisions of the Supreme Court following Erie
clearly show the application of federal common law as a rule of decision over state law is
proper under certain conditions.23 In fact, on the same day Erie was decided, the
Supreme Court allowed the adoption of a general rule of decision under federal common
law to apportion the water of an interstate stream between two states.24 As a general rule,
the Court has stated “in the absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal
courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards.”25
However, the substantive application of federal common law, where there is a
dispute between two states, still carries with it serious constitutional concerns.26
Primarily, problems with separation of powers and federalism may arise.27 Professor
Bradford R. Clark adequately explains the dilemma:
First, federal common law, because not clearly rooted in statutory or constitutional
sources, appears to involve judicial lawmaking - a task at least in tension with federal
separation of powers. To be sure, federal courts undoubtedly engage in interstitial
“lawmaking,” as part of the process of interpreting positive law. By hypothesis, at least,
federal common lawmaking begins where interpretation ends. Such open-ended
lawmaking by courts raises constitutional concerns because it bears a troublesome
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resemblance to the exercise of legislative power - power apparently reserved by the
Constitution to the political branches.
Second, because federal common law preempts state law, federal common law also raises
two related federalism concerns, at least as applied to matters within the legislative
competence of the states. Federal common law arguably intrudes upon state authority by
departing from the Constitution and the Rules of Decision Act, which - as interpreted in
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins - appear to require federal courts to apply state law
“except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress.”
(citation omitted) Federal common law further threatens the autonomy and independence
of the states by requiring state courts to apply federal judge-made law notwithstanding
contrary state law, even though the Constitution's reference to the "supreme Law of the
Land" does not obviously include federal judge-made law.28
In response to these concerns, the Supreme Court has spoken in terms of limiting
the scope of federal common law to “several well-recognized enclaves.”29 The Supreme
Court has recognized those enclaves to be “in such narrow areas as those concerned with
the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and international disputes
implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign nations, and
admiralty cases.”30 While some commentators suggest the “enclave” approach provides
some foundation for courts to “mitigate the constitutional difficulties,”31 others observe
they provide little in the way of guidance since they “‘simply list areas of law or
categories of cases in which federal common law is permissible’ without providing any
‘underlying rationale other than grandfathering.’”32
Commentators have struggled with fashioning a uniform standard for courts to
adopt when applying a federal common law rule of decision.33 Indeed, the application of
federal common law is amorphous and enigmatic considering the relatively low level of34
and seemingly inconsistent35 guidance provided by the Supreme Court. This paper does
not assert any proposed approach is applicable to the ancillary disgorgement proceeding
of an SEC appointed receiver. It merely observes that the constitutional questions
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surrounding the substantive application of federal common law to these sorts of
proceedings, mainly questions of federalism, are not necessarily implicated as a practical
matter in these ancillary proceedings. Whether the application of a substantive rule of
federal common law is appropriate in the constitutional sense is subject to philosophical
constitutional inquiry and is beyond the scope of this paper.

A. Evolution of Federal Common Law in the Post-Erie Era
In the post-Erie era, the Supreme Court has addressed the application of federal
common law in cases where the U.S. government has been a party36 as well as in
diversity actions between private parties.37 While the Supreme Court’s rationale for
allowing or denying the application of federal common law is relatively unclear and
possibly inconsistent especially with respect to private parties,38 the substantive
application of federal common law over state law is clearest under three distinct and
recognizable circumstances. A brief overview of the Supreme Court’s decisions
regarding federal common law in cases involving both the federal government and
private citizens as parties over the last six decades reveals such a trend.
1. The Federal Government as a Litigant
The clearest and most oft cited Supreme Court decision regarding the application
of federal common law to displace state law where the federal government is a litigant is
perhaps Clearfield Trust Co. v. U.S.39 In Clearfield Trust, the United States was
attempting to recover from Clearfield Trust funds drawn through a forged endorsement
upon a check issued by the U.S. government.40 Clearfield Trust had guaranteed all prior
endorsements upon the check in compliance with federal regulations prior to presenting it

9

to the Federal Reserve Bank for payment.41 The forgery was reported to the United States
but was not immediately made known to Clearfield Trust.42 Subsequently, an action
against Clearfield Trust was brought in federal court by the U.S. several months later. At
issue was whether the rights of the parties were governed by state law and whether the
federal government was barred from recovery for unreasonable delay as a result.43
The Supreme Court held:
We agree... that the rule of Erie does not apply to this
action. The rights and duties of the United States on
commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal
rather than local law. When the United States disburses its
funds or pays its debts, it is exercising a constitutional
function or power. This check was issued for services
performed under the Federal Emergency Relief Act of
1935, 49 Stat. 115. The authority to issue the check had its
origin in the Constitution and the statutes of the United
States and was in no way dependent on the laws of
Pennsylvania or of any other state. (citations omitted) The
duties imposed upon the United States and the rights
acquired by it as a result of the issuance find their roots in
the same federal sources. (citations omitted) In absence of
an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to
fashion the governing rule of law according to their own
standards...
In our choice of the applicable federal rule we have
occasionally selected state law. (citation omitted) But
reasons which may make state law at times the appropriate
federal rule are singularly inappropriate here. The issuance
of commercial paper by the United States is on a vast scale
and transactions in that paper from issuance to payment
will commonly occur in several states. The application of
state law, even without the conflict of laws rules of the
forum, would subject the rights and duties of the United
States to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great
diversity in results by making identical transactions subject
to the vagaries of the laws of the several states. The
desirability of a uniform rule is plain.44
From the Court’s ruling in Clearfield Trust, it is evident that where the authority
of the government comes directly from a federal source, the source being either the
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Constitution or a federal statute, the need for applying a rule of federal common law may
be warranted.45 The Court suggests the need is increased if the application of state law
“would subject the rights and duties of the United States to exceptional (emphasis added)
uncertainty”46 and result in “making identical transactions subject to the vagaries of the
laws of the several states.”47 The ultimate effect of adopting state law in this case would
have been to frustrate the federal government’s ability to discharge its duties. The forged
check in this case was an offense against the United States.48 As the Court discussed, the
U.S. had a clear right and duty to sue for recovery on this check; a right which flowed
from the Constitution and the statutes of the United States.49
Therefore, the principle to be drawn from Clearfield Trust with respect to the
application of federal common law over state law is that where the federal government is
a party to an action, if the source of the government’s authority is derived from the
Constitution or from a “statute[ ] of the United States,”50 the adoption of a uniform rule is
proper if the adoption of state law would shatter uniformity and frustrate an essential
federal interest. The Court appeared to implicate a problem with adopting a rule of state
law in a manner which would seriously impede the government’s ability to affect an
affirmative duty and right which was distinctly federal in nature and purpose. In fact, this
principle has subsequently guided the Supreme Court in decisions regarding the
application of federal common law where the federal government is a litigant, most
notably in U.S. v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. 51
In Kimbell Foods, two actions filed in two different states (Texas and Georgia) by
the SBA and FHA were on appeal to the Supreme Court. The Texas action concerned
whether priority should have been given to an SBA commercial lien over that of a private
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creditor’s (Kimbell’s) lien even though the SBA’s lien was perfected subsequent to
Kimbell’s.52 Though both liens were perfected in accordance with Texas law, the SBA
argued the “choate lien rule” applied under federal common law over Texas law giving
priority to their lien since Kimbell’s lien interest was not sufficiently specific to allow
them “first in time” status.53 The Georgia action involved an FHA lien issued to secure a
tractor that was subsequently acquired by a repairman through Georgia law after the
tractor owner could not pay for repairs made by the repairman.54 In the recovery suit
filed by the FHA against the repairman, the District Court found Georgia law to be
applicable giving priority interest to the repairman.55 On appeal, though the Court of
Appeals ruled against the FHA, it held federal common law to be applicable to the
circumstances of the case and devised a special rule derived from the U.C.C. to award the
tractor to the repairman.56
While the Supreme Court found the authority of the SBA and FHA to be derived
from a federal source consistent with the factors in Clearfield Trust,57 it did not find that
the uncertainties “resulting from the application of state law would frustrate specific
objectives of [their] federal programs” enough to adopt a uniform federal rule.58 Relying
on precedent from United States v. Yazell,59 the Supreme Court held:
Because SBA operations were “specifically and in great
detail adapted to state law,” (citation omitted) the federal
interest in supplanting “important and carefully evolved
state arrangements designed to serve multiple purposes”
was minimal. (citation omitted) Our conclusion [in Yazell]
that compliance with state law would produce no hardship
on the agency was also based on the SBA's practice of
“individually [negotiating] in painfully particularized
detail” each loan transaction. (citation omitted) These
observations apply with equal force here and compel us
again to reject generalized pleas for uniformity as
substitutes for concrete evidence that adopting state law
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would adversely affect administration of the federal
programs.60
Since the FHA regulations also incorporated state law in a manner similar to the SBA, the
same logic also precluded the application of a uniform rule to their action.61
The Court further ruled:
Because the ultimate consequences of altering settled
commercial practices are so difficult to foresee, we hesitate
to create new uncertainties, in the absence of careful
legislative deliberation. Of course, formulating special rules
to govern the priority of the federal consensual liens in
issue here would be justified if necessary to vindicate
important national interests. (emphasis added) But neither
the Government nor the Court of Appeals advanced any
concrete reasons for rejecting well-established commercial
rules which have proven workable over time. Thus, the
prudent course is to adopt the readymade body of state law
as the federal rule of decision until Congress strikes a
different accommodation.62
The level of uncertainty in outcome that could frustrate uniformity adversely
affecting a federal interest which in turn would warrant the application of a federal
common law rule was clarified by Kimbell Foods, Inc. The Court in Kimbell appeared to
establish a vague guideline. Even though authority from a federal source may be found63
and uniformity in outcome may lead to uncertainty in result, these factors alone will not
necessitate displacing state law in favor of a uniform federal rule. 64 The degree to which
a federal interest is frustrated must also be considered and weighed against a state’s
reliance upon the law in question.65 In Kimbell, both the SBA and FHA anticipated the
applicability of state law to their lending programs and conformed their programs to these
expectations66 indicating that the federal programs would not necessarily be disturbed
absent a uniform rule. In light of these factors, the Court appeared more concerned with
how a uniform federal rule would alter “settled commercial practices”67 established
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around state law. Consequently, displacement should only occur when “specific
objectives” of a federal law or a federal purpose are frustrated.68
Arguably, the Court’s decision reveals that with regard to uniformity, a two
pronged analysis is necessary. First, a Court should consider to what level the state law
being displaced by a uniform federal rule is relied upon. In the commercial context,
Kimbell shows that if state commercial law is well settled and generally relied upon,
indicating an anticipation that state law will apply to a particular transaction, a uniform
federal rule is likely not appropriate. Secondly, if a state’s reliance on the law is
considerably frustrated by adoption of a uniform rule, a Court should consider to what
level that reliance is frustrated if a uniform federal rule is adopted. Reiterating the
Court’s position in Kimbell, if the “ultimate consequences of altering settled commercial
practices [is]... difficult to foresee,”69 then a uniform rule displacing state law is not
suitable.
It is important to note that an interesting dilemma does surface in light of both
Clearfield Trust and Kimbell Foods with respect to the twin dangers of federalism and
separation of powers issues implicated from the application of federal judge-made law.
In Clearfield Trust, the Court finds the circumstances compelling enough to warrant
adoption of a uniform federal rule so as not to frustrate an important federal function
regardless of significantly state law would be displaced. However, little consideration is
given to whether the judiciary, as a lawmaker, is competent to fashion the uniform rule
necessary to achieve the specific federal purpose invoking some separation of powers
concern. Similarly, the Court in Kimbell Foods also seems overly concerned with how
state law, with regard to commercial expectations, would be frustrated by adoption of a
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federal rule and does not delve deeply into whether a federal court is authorized to create
such a rule (probably because it did not need to reach the issue); although it did note that
“formulating special rules to govern... here would be justified if necessary to vindicate
important national interests” perhaps indicating if compelling federal interests did exist,
as they did in Clearfield Trust, displacing even settled state law could be appropriate.
Both cases seem to suggest that if the federal interest or function in question is
significantly frustrated, the balance is tilted considerably in favor of adopting a judicial
rule of law. The problem left unanswered by the Supreme Court, as alluded to
previously, is whether the “interstitial lawmaking”70 of a federal judge is sufficiently
weighed against the federal legislature’s authority, interest and competence to address the
conflict. However, it is possible to construe the Supreme Court’s lack of consideration
for the separation of powers issue in another manner; and that is, when the frustration of
the federal interest or function is so egregious that it would severely hinder an essential or
central federal purpose unnecessarily subjugating the federal government to the
uncertainty of state law, as was the case in Clearfield Trust, the urgency and need for
implementing a rule of law to adequately dispose of an issue in favor of the federal
government will always outweigh any separation of powers considerations. Furthermore,
it should be noted that a legislature’s ability to act to displace or rectify judge-made law
is not effected in any way by the adoption of a uniform rule as federal common law.
Regardless of these Constitutional concerns, the lessons to be drawn from
Clearfield Trust and Kimbell Foods in analyzing the application of federal common law
to the ancillary proceedings of the SEC appointed receiver is to focus on the nature of a
commercial transaction and the state laws applicable to that transaction. This will play an
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important role in determining whether adopting a uniform rule under federal common law
is proper when considering the fraudulent transfer made as part of the Ponzi scheme.
2. Private Litigants
It is well settled that the substantive application of federal common law to
displace state law is not limited only to cases where the federal government is a litigant.71
However, considerable confusion remains as to what circumstances must exist in order to
adopt a rule of federal common law in actions between private parties. The Supreme
Court’s development of federal common law in litigation involving private litigants has
seemingly been inconsistent.72 In fact, commentators have observed “some [Supreme
Court] cases suggest that the federal interest may be less immediately implicated in
litigation to which the United States is not a party,”73 while other cases have allowed the
adoption of federal common law among private litigants where the federal interest was
ostensibly just as tenuous.74 Nevertheless, the controlling principle behind the adoption of
federal common law to displace state law in these cases has been whether there will be a
direct effect upon an identifiable federal interest or function in the absence of such
adoption having the consequence of frustrating a specific federal objective or creating a
significant conflict with federal law.75
Perhaps the most significant Supreme Court case dealing with the substantive
application of federal common law between private litigants which may provide some
guidance for private litigation in ancillary proceedings where federal interest are
implicated is Boyle v. United Tech. Corp.76 In Boyle, the father of a Marine helicopter
pilot brought a defective repair and negligent manufacture claim against the independent
defense contractor who designed the helicopter flown by the pilot. The pilot perished in a
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crash alleged to have been the result of negligent repair flaws and design defects which
prevented his timely escape after the helicopter went down.77 At issue was whether a
“military contractor defense” could be asserted by the contractor under federal common
law to preclude the father’s recovery under his state law claim since the contractor
designed the helicopter in accordance with a contract entered into with the United
States.78
The Court concluded two areas of “uniquely federal interest[]”79 were involved.
First, the Court recognized that the obligations of the United States under contract were
governed exclusively by federal law.80 While the case at hand did not involve the
obligations of the United States under contract, but rather the liability to third persons, the
liability nevertheless arose from performance of a federal contract.81 Secondly, the Court
acknowledged that the “civil liability of federal officials for actions taken in the course of
their duty”82 was, in many instances, controlled by federal law.83 Analogizing from
Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Const. Co.,84 an earlier decided case in which a private landowner
was precluded from holding a private contractor liable under state law for building dikes
for the federal government, the Court reasoned:
“[I]f [the] (sic) authority to carry out the project was validly
conferred, that is, if what was done was within the
constitutional power of Congress, there is no liability on the
part of the contractor for executing its will.”(quoting
Yearsley) The federal interest justifying this holding surely
exists as much in procurement contracts as in performance
contracts; we see no basis for a distinction.
The Court went on to distinguish Boyle from other previously decided cases
involving private litigants where the “‘federal interest in the outcome of the [dispute]
before... [was] (sic) far too speculative, far too remote a possibility to justify the
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application of federal law....’”85 Instead, Boyle involved a case where the circumstances
would have a more direct effect.86 The Court extrapolated:
The imposition of liability on Government contractors will
directly affect the terms of Government contracts: either the
contractor will decline to manufacture the design specified
by the Government, or it will raise its price. Either way, the
interests of the United States will be directly affected.
Therefore, the federal objective implicated was not too attenuated or speculative.2
Having concluded that a “uniquely federal interest” existed, the Court then turned
to Kimbell Foods second criterion for determining whether to displace settled state law,
namely, gauging whether a “significant conflict” between the identified federal interest or
2

Boyle was decided by a divided court (5-4) that disagreed strongly on whether the facts of Boyle were
necessarily distinguishable from past cases involving the displacement of state law by federal common law
among private litigants. Justice Brennan keenly observed there was no distinction in the present case from
past cases:
In Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977), for example, the county was contractually
obligated under a grant agreement with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to “‘restrict
the use of land adjacent to . . . the Airport to activities and purposes compatible with normal
airport operations including landing and takeoff of aircraft.’”(citation omitted). At issue was
whether the county breached its contractual obligation by operating a garbage dump adjacent to
the airport, which allegedly attracted the swarm of birds that caused a plane crash. Federal
common law would undoubtedly have controlled in any suit by the Federal Government to enforce
the provision against the county or to collect damages for its violation. The diversity suit,
however, was brought not by the Government, but by assorted private parties injured in some way
by the accident. We observed that “the operations of the United States in connection with FAA
grants such as these are undoubtedly of considerable magnitude,” (citation omitted) and that “the
United States has a substantial interest in regulating aircraft travel and promoting air travel
safety.” (citation omitted). Nevertheless, we held that state law should govern the claim because
“only the rights of private litigants are at issue here,” (citation omitted) and the claim against the
county “will have no direct effect upon the United States or its Treasury.” (emphasis added) (sic).
[Discussion of other cases involving private litigants]
...
Here, as in Miree... a Government contract governed by federal common law looms in the
background. But here, too, the United States is not a party to the suit and the suit neither
“touch[es] the rights and duties of the United States,” (citation omitted) nor has a “direct effect
upon the United States or its Treasury,” (citation omitted) The relationship at issue is at best
collateral to the Government contract. We have no greater power to displace state law governing
the collateral relationship in the Government procurement realm than we had to dictate federal
rules governing equally collateral relationships in the areas of aviation, Government-issued
commercial paper, or federal lands.
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp, 487 U.S. 500, 520-21 (1988)(Brennan J., dissenting).
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related federal legislation would result if state law were applied87 or whether “application
of state law would ‘frustrate specific objectives’ of federal legislation.”88 Ultimately the
Court found that allowing a state law claim to proceed would in fact disrupt an exception
to the Federal Tort Claims Act which precluded claims “based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency...whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”89 The Court
concluded:
We think that the selection of the appropriate design for
military equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is
assuredly a discretionary function within the meaning of
this provision. It often involves not merely engineering
analysis but judgment as to the balancing of many
technical, military, and even social considerations,
including specifically the trade-off between greater safety
and greater combat effectiveness. And we are further of the
view that permitting “second-guessing” of these judgments
(citation omitted) through state tort suits against contractors
would produce the same effect sought to be avoided by the
FTCA exemption. The financial burden of judgments
against the contractors would ultimately be passed through,
substantially if not totally, to the United States itself, since
defense contractors will predictably raise their prices to
cover, or to insure against, contingent liability for the
Government-ordered designs. To put the point differently:
It makes little sense to insulate the Government against
financial liability for the judgment that a particular feature
of military equipment is necessary when the Government
produces the equipment itself, but not when it contracts for
the production. In sum, we are of the view that state law
which holds Government contractors liable for design
defects in military equipment does in some circumstances
present a “significant conflict” with federal policy and must
be displaced.
B.

Post-Erie Developments of Federal Common Law and their Potential
Applicability in the Ancillary Disgorgement Proceedings of the SEC
Appointed Receiver
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Though the party claiming the benefit of the federal common law rule in Boyle
was a private litigant, the Supreme Court was not prevented from finding a uniquely
federal interest. The principle that a private litigant cannot be prevented from invoking a
rule of federal common law will be helpful to the SEC appointed receiver who is
necessarily a private litigant. More importantly, Clearfield Trust and Kimbell Foods both
establish that where the source of authority of the party claiming the benefit of the federal
rule is derived from a federal source of law, the need for adopting a uniform rule may be
warranted. This establishes the first criteria for federal common law analysis. This
criteria will be important to the SEC appointed receiver whose authority is arguably
derived from the Securities and Exchanges Acts.90
While a federal interest may be implicated, the inquiry does not stop there.
According the law of Boyle and Kimbell Foods taken together, before adoption of the
federal rule, the court must consider whether the federal interest or purpose will be
directly effected. A consequence that is too remote or speculative on the interest will not
be sufficient to warrant adoption of a uniform federal rule. Furthermore, significant
conflict between the displaced state law and the identified federal interest must exist or it
must be shown that displacement of the state law is necessary to avoid frustration of the
federal interest. This analysis sets up the second criteria for federal common law
analysis. For the SEC appointed receiver, conflict between state law and the goals and
purposes of the Securities and Exchanges Acts will be at issue when considering the
displacement of state fraudulent conveyance law or state veil-piercing doctrines.
It should be noted that the Supreme Court’s analysis in these cases take the
federalism issues into consideration, but do little to quell the separation of powers
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concerns associated with the implementation of judge-made law.3 The competency of the
judiciary to act as a quasi-legislature is rightly questioned when considering the adoption
of a uniform rule of federal common law. Though the Supreme Court has ruled that a
federal interest can be compelling enough to displace state law overriding federalism
concerns, as was the case in Clearfield Trust and Boyle, the authority and competence of
the judiciary to create uniform rules to affect federal interests signals a dilemma with
separation of powers which has not be thoroughly addressed by the Supreme Court.
Arguably, the Supreme Court’s relatively minimal consideration of this issue was
in cases where the frustration of the federal interests or functions were so egregious that
they would have severely hindered essential or central federal purposes unnecessarily
subjugating the federal government to the uncertainty of state law as was the case in
Clearfield Trust or allow for the “second-guessing”91 of intrinsically federal discretionary
powers as was the case in Boyle. The urgency and need for implementing a rule of law to
adequately dispose of conflicts issue in favor of the federal government where such
integral federal interests were implicated may have outweighed any separation of powers
considerations. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, Congress’ ability to act to displace or

3

This was indeed a deeply disturbing fact for Justice Stevens who dissented in Boyle:
When judges are asked to embark on a lawmaking venture, I believe they should carefully
consider whether they, or a legislative body, are better equipped to perform the task at hand. There
are instances of so-called interstitial lawmaking that inevitably become part of the judicial
process. n1 But when we are asked to create an entirely new doctrine -- to answer "questions of
policy on which Congress has not spoken," (citation omitted) -- we have a special duty to identify
the proper decisionmaker before trying to make the proper decision.
When the novel question of policy involves a balancing of the conflicting interests in the efficient
operation of a massive governmental program and the protection of the rights of the individual -whether in the social welfare context, the civil service context, or the military procurement context
-- I feel very deeply that we should defer to the expertise of the Congress.
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 531-32 (1988) (Stevens J., dissenting)
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rectify judge-made law is not effected in any way by the adoption of a uniform rule as
federal common law.
The adoption of a uniform rule under federal common law to displace state
fraudulent conveyance law is similarly one of compelling federal concern to the SEC
appointed receiver. As discussion in the next part will show, the application of different
state fraudulent conveyance laws to the disgorgement proceedings will severely frustrate
the impetus behind the Securities and Exchanges Acts to protect unsophisticated
investors. The need to adopt a uniform fraudulent conveyance rule in such proceedings
implicates no real frustration or binding obligation on state law and is in fact irrelevant to
a state’s reliance on fraudulent conveyance law which is primarily a law applicable in the
bankruptcy context. Furthermore, adoption of different state veil-piercing doctrines over
a federal veil-piercing standard to reach majority shareholders of offshore entities
investing in Ponzi schemes creates a significant conflict with the goals of the 33 and 34
Acts if the corporate veils of such entities are not pierced. The next part will show that
the frustration of these federal purposes by adoption of state law create the compelling
circumstances necessary to adopt a uniform rule of federal common law.

II.

Federal Common Law in the Disgorgement Proceedings of SEC
Appointed Receivers
A. Ponzi Schemes and the Appointment of Receiverships
1. The Ponzi Scheme as a Violation of the Securities and Exchange Acts
In order for a Ponzi Scheme92 to violate the Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933

and 1934, the Ponzi scheme must first satisfy Section 2(a)(1) of the 33 Act. The 33 and
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34 Acts only govern what can be defined as “securities.”93 The Supreme court has read
Section 2(a)(1) liberally, saying that Congress defined “security” so broadly that it may
encompass virtually any instrument that might be sold as an investment.94 Whether or
not a transaction falls within the meaning of a security is based on the economic realities
involved in the transaction.95
The Securities Act, for purposes of characterization of a Ponzi scheme, partially
defines an “investment contract” as a security.96 The term “investment contract” is
defined as any “contract, transaction, or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a
common enterprise and is lead to expect profits solely from the efforts of a promoter or
third party.”97

The well-known Howey test delineates a three part standard for purposes

of determining whether a transaction falls within the SEC's interpretation of an
investment contract. This standard shows that in order for an “investment contract” to be
deemed a security the transaction must include (1) an investment of money, (2) in a
common enterprise with (3) the expectation of profits produced by the efforts of others.98
The typical Ponzi scheme requires the investment of money.99 Therefore, the first
prong of the Howey test is satisfied. Second, investors in the Ponzi scheme usually invest
their money into a single entity, usually a fictional corporation established by the
operators of the scheme. As a result, investments can be seen as becoming part of a
common enterprise in conformance with the second prong of the Howey test.100 Ponzi
schemes lure investors through promises of high returns on investments through the
efforts of the scheme operators. Restated, investments are made in the scheme, generally
by average and unsophisticated investors, solely for the high rate of promised returns
coming from the “investment” efforts of the scheme operators through their managing of
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the fictional entity.101 Therefore, in a typical Ponzi scheme, the three criteria delineated
in Howey are met.
Section 17(a) of the 33 Act, Section 10 of the 34 Act, and Rule 10(b)(5)
encompass the basic anti-fraud provisions of the Acts applicable against the perpetrator
or perpetrators of a Ponzi Scheme.102 These provisions all prohibit fraudulent conduct or
practices in connection with the offer or sale of securities.103 In order to be liable for
securities fraud, the accused must have made (1) a material misrepresentation or a
material omission as to which he has a duty to speak, or used a fraudulent device, (2)
with scienter, (3) in connection with the sale of a security.104 A showing of scienter is an
element of an enforcement action pursuant to the antifraud provisions of the Securities
Acts.105 Scienter is the mental state of intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.106 Intent
on the part of the perpetrator of the alleged Ponzi scheme, or the perpetrator as an agent
for the corporation heading the scheme, is required in order to enforce any of these
provisions of the Acts.107
2. The Appointment of a Receiver and the Disgorgement of Fraudulent Transfers
Since the promised rates of return in a Ponzi scheme are always in excess of any
real investment and creditors are unable to be paid by nature of the scheme’s structure, a
“Ponzi corporation” is deemed to be effectively insolvent from its inception.108 A federal
court, in dealing with the assets of an insolvent Ponzi corporation, may appoint a receiver
to marshal and collect misappropriated funds in order to redistribute those funds to
creditors and defrauded investors. The legal fiction is that the receiver acts on behalf of
the corporation and not the investors in the scheme because the Ponzi corporation is
considered to be a “legal entit[y] separate from principal and injured by [fraudulent]
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transfers.”109 The fraudulent transfers are the fictitious “profit” distributions paid to old
investors from new investor funds. The appointment of a receiver takes the corporation
and its assets out of the hands of the wrongdoer and places them in the hands of the
receiver.110
The receiver may bring actions based on law or equity in any state, federal, or
foreign court to recover fraudulent conveyances made as part of the scheme.111 A
receiver is generally appointed in the jurisdiction where the SEC brings action against the
operators of the scheme. In actions brought in federal court, the federal court maintains
ancillary or pendent jurisdiction over any claims filed by the receiver to disgorge
fraudulent transfers.112 Because the Ponzi corporation is not considered bankrupt under
the meaning of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the receiver proceeds to disgorge fraudulent
transfers under the applicable state fraudulent conveyance law as opposed to federal
fraudulent conveyance law.113
Receiverships in Ponzi scheme situations allow defrauded investors to obtain
redress efficiently through the receiverships power. A receiver in a typical Ponzi scheme
proceeding of securities fraud seeks out and recovers the corporation’s misappropriated
assets, used and acquired as a result of the scheme, in order to redistribute them among
defrauded investors involved in the scheme. Similar to a trustee in bankruptcy, a receiver
may only sue to redress injuries to the entity in receivership.114 The receiver's job is to
maximize the value of the Ponzi corporation ultimately for the benefit of the
corporation’s defrauded investors and creditors.115 Stated in other terms, the receiver's
goal is to maximize the recovery of funds invested in the scheme so that they may be
returned in some degree to the wronged investors.
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B.

The Receiver’s Choice of Law Problems

The greatest obstacle for a receiver to overcome in disgorging fraudulent transfers
made to investors is resolving the extraordinary number of conflicts of law issues which
arise during litigation.116 As discussed earlier, the receiver must bring actions against
individual investors under state fraudulent conveyance law in federal court through the
federal court’s pendant or ancillary jurisdiction over the federal claims against the
operators of the Ponzi scheme.117 Therefore, the first conflict of law issue to decide is
under which state fraudulent conveyance law the receiver should proceed. Depending on
whom the action is brought against and which jurisdiction the investor resides in, this can
be a daunting task as the ensuing discussion shows.
Often times, the lucrative nature of a Ponzi scheme will attract the more
sophisticated investor with its high promised rates of return. These investors often invest
as single shareholders of offshore entities. Sometimes, as is often the case, these
investors can be indirect insiders to the general scheme.118 The shareholder investing on
behalf of her wholly owned offshore corporation and receiving distributions under the
name of the offshore corporation is particularly troublesome and can give rise to
numerous conflicts issues. Ideally, the appropriate measure to take in such a
circumstance would be to pierce the veil of the offshore corporation in order to reach the
domestic single or majority shareholder receiving contributions from the scheme in a
U.S. Federal Court. However, the divergence of veil-piercing doctrines from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction may impede the possibility of such an action or may shift a heavier burden
of proof on the receiver extending the amount of time in litigation and cost of
litigation.119
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Using the 8th Circuits reasoning from Bryan v. Barlett as adopted by the Western
District of Virginia in Terry v. June,120 this section will also show how a uniform federal
veil-piercing doctrine and a uniform fraudulent conveyance rule can be applied under
federal common law in these circumstances to displace conflicting state laws.
1. The Problem with Determining Which Fraudulent Conveyance Law Applies
For conflicts of law purposes it is important to first characterize the nature of the
legal issue.121 Generally, for purposes of determining conflicts of law, many federal
courts have characterized fraudulent conveyances as torts.122 While some courts have
held otherwise,123 a strong argument in favor of classifying fraudulent conveyances as
torts committed against the Ponzi corporation is that the nature of the scheme itself
warrants such an interpretation. When investors receive distributions in excess of their
contribution, the corporation becomes increasingly insolvent. 124 In fact, the corporation
is insolvent the moment the distribution is made.125 Each transfer made to an investor in
excess of their contribution effectively depletes the assets of the Ponzi corporation.126
Therefore, it can be argued that each distribution accepted and retained by an investor
amounts to a tort against the Ponzi corporation contributing to its insolvency.
This argument may be successful in satisfying that a tort has been committed
against the Ponzi corporation and that an investor should be held liable. However, the
matter of where the tort has occurred still remains unresolved. For resolving conflicts of
law questions, this is the essential issue. Determining where the tort has occurred may
determine which state’s fraudulent conveyance law is to be applied. Of course, this
analysis is easier stated than done.
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To begin with, in diversity actions a federal court must apply the conflicts laws of
the state in which it sits.127 While the federal court’s jurisdiction over the receiver’s claim
is ancillary to the federal question claim against the Ponzi scheme operators and is not a
diversity action, the receiver’s fraudulent conveyance actions will be exclusively state
law claims.128 Therefore, it can be argued that the conflicts laws of the forum state
should be applied as in diversity actions brought under state law.129 This approach
presents the most practical and outcome determinative solution to resolving which state’s
conflicts principles should be applied in order to determine what state law is applicable.
Naturally, the next step would be to apply the forum state’s conflicts principles to
determine which state’s law governs. Most states have adopted either the “rational
relationship” test under the Restatements130 or follow the well-settled principle of lex loci
delicti, also known as the “place of the wrong” test.131 The “rational relationship” inquiry
focuses on which state has the most significant relationship with the transaction, or the
tort in the Ponzi scheme context.132 The principle of lex loci delicti requires the court to
look into the last act necessary to complete the transaction or tort.133 For purposes of
fraudulent conveyances, under both of these tests the court would be required to examine
either how the conveyances came about or what the last act necessary to complete the tort
of fraudulent conveyance was. Under this analysis, it appears the focus of inquiry in the
Ponzi scheme context would be where the acts occurred which depleted the Ponzi
corporations assets. This could mean either looking to where the investment contract was
formed, what state or states the majority of the distributions to the investor were made in
or from, or, if distributions were made by checks or wire transfers to investors, where the
last acts necessary to complete those transactions occurred.
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Regardless of which approach is taken, the analysis is unnecessarily protracted
and fails to provide a predictable outcome from case to case. A strong position can be
taken on each of the above mentioned possibilities for resolving conflicts of law
disputes.134 This compounds problems for the receiver. It results in the receiver being
burdened with more litigation against the investor with respect to resolving these issues
increasing time and cost. More importantly, there is no uniformity in outcome.
Fraudulent conveyance diverges from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.135 The application of
fraudulent conveyance law in one jurisdiction could conceivably allow an investor to
keep her distributions while the law of another may require a similarly situated investor
to disgorge. In essence, the receiver is faced with fresh choice of law issues in each new
action brought against investors to disgorge distributions which can break either in favor
of the investor or the receiver. In the end, the consequence is more time and money spent
in recovering investor funds and depletion of the recovery which is to be redistributed
back to investors who have lost their principle investment in the scheme.
2. Problems with Piercing Offshore Entities
The most traditional method of asset and liability protection has been the
establishment of corporations, limited liability partnerships and limited liability
companies.136 In particular, establishing such entities offshore in island nations such as
the Bahamas or the Cayman Islands can provide a substantial form of asset and liability
protection for the individual investor. Many sophisticated Ponzi investors who are
indirect insiders to the scheme, knowing of the nature of the scheme and the scheme’s
eventual demise, having tremendously benefited from its generous “profit” distributions,
enter the scheme as single or majority shareholders of such entities in order to thwart
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litigation or, at the very least, make it costly and difficult to disgorge their ill gotten
gains.
Establishing jurisdiction over offshore entities can be a substantial barrier. Under
U.S. law, the corporation or entity must be served in accordance with the Hague
Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-Judicial Documents in Civil and
Commercial Matters.137 This assumes the offshore entity resides in a country that is party
to the treaty.4 The Convention requires “[t]he authority or judicial officer competent
under the law of the State in which the documents originate” to forward copies of the
document to the designated Central Authority in the country where the documents are to
be served.138 Once delivered to the Central Authority, the Central Authority must
approve that service has complied with the provisions of the Convention and only then
will it proceed to serve the documents.139
This poses some major obstacles for the receiver. Process can take between 3-6
months to complete placing an extraordinary time impediment on recovering investor
funds. Fraudulent conveyance actions brought by the receiver are subject to a statute of
limitations (generally two years) from the time of appointment. Discovering distributions
made in excess of the principle invested and tracing transfers made to individual
shareholders of such entities can take over a year leaving the receiver with limited time to
bring an action against such an entity. Furthermore, assuming service is had, jurisdiction
is found proper and a judgment is attained, a federal court exercising ancillary
jurisdiction may not retain jurisdiction to enforce the judgment.140 This may leave the
receiver with having the judgment enforced against the individual or majority shareholder

4

Currently the Hague Convention on Service Abroad is in force in these offshore nations: Aruba, Bahamas,
Barbados, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
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in either a state court in the state in which the investor resides or in the foreign court of
the country in which the entity is incorporated or formed.
This poses two practical problems. Under the first scenario, a state court will
naturally adopt its own veil piercing doctrine in order to determine whether the judgment
can be enforced against an individual shareholder. Depending on the stringency of the
veil-piercing doctrine it will either prevent the receiver from piercing to reach the
shareholder or may require the receiver to prove more facts which warrant piercing under
the state’s doctrine increasing the receiver’s time and cost of litigation.
Under the second scenario, a foreign court may be reluctant to enforce a judgment
entered in a non-native jurisdiction because they may be dissatisfied with the manner in
which process is served141 or because of due process concerns.142 The principal of
“territoriality” may also be cumbersome to overcome in enforcing any judgments
obtained in the U.S.143 One commentator examines: “As an initial matter, a judgment can
be enforced only within the territorial jurisdiction of the court that entered it. To enforce
against property in another [foreign] jurisdiction, the holder must establish its judgment
in that jurisdiction. The ‘full faith and credit’ clause of the United States Constitution
assures that a judgment of one state will be enforced in the courts of another; the
principle merely requires formal proof of the existence and validity of the judgment.
Foreign countries, however, may require that the underlying cause of action be
relitigated.” 144 The United States is not yet party to any treaties for the enforcement of
judgments abroad.
C. Overcoming Conflicts of Law Issues Through Adopting Federal Common Law
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Taking the Clearfield Trust, Kimbell and Boyle cases into consideration in the
SEC appointed receivership context, three major hurdles emerge for the SEC appointed
receiver of a Ponzi corporation to overcome. First, the receiver must establish some
source of federal authority for invoking a uniform federal rule. The 8th Circuit’s
reasoning in Bryan v. Barlett is satisfying and in conformance with established law with
respect to this factor. Next, a receiver must show that adoption of a uniform rule is
necessary to affect a federal interest or purpose. Finally, the receiver must show that the
displacement of state law will not raise the general concerns of federalism when federal
common law is applied substantively. This analysis was not made in Bryan most likely
because adoption of a uniform federal fraudulent conveyance rule in the Ponzi receiver
context, which was at issue in the case, was irrelevant to the ordinary transactions which
state fraudulent conveyance laws normally address and did not implicate the
unforeseeable consequences mentioned in Kimbell.145 However, this analysis may be
important in adopting a uniform federal veil-piercing doctrine over state law doctrines in
a disgorgement proceeding dealing with a Ponzi investor investing as an offshore entity.
1. The Concept of a Receiver Serving a Federal Interest and Function
The proposition that a Court appointed Receiver serves a federal interest is
directly supported in Bryan v. Bartlett.146 In Bryan, the SEC sued a bank seeking to
enjoin violations of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934.147 The court entered a
temporary injunction and appointed a federal equity receiver over the bank to protect
defrauded investors.148 The receiver then sued the bank’s directors to recover on certain
promissory notes belonging to the bank.149 The directors argued that state law should
govern their defenses in the case150 but the 8th Circuit disagreed:
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We find this proposition doubtful. Federal
jurisdiction in this case is based, not on diversity of
citizenship, but on a federal equity receivership
arising from violation of the federal securities
regulation statutes. The receiver was appointed in
this case to prevent further violations of the federal
securities laws and to preserve the assets for the
benefit of the investor-creditors of the companies,
who are primarily individual citizens of many
different states and whose financial interests were
endangered by the securities law violations of the
defendants. As Professor Loss points out, “surely
this [SEC receivership proceeding] is an instance of
the post-Erie survival of a ‘federal common law’ (in
this case, equity).” 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation
1513 n.113 (1961).
We find no cases directly in point on this issue,
but an analogy may be drawn from the case of
D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447,
62 S. Ct. 676, 86 L. Ed. 956 (1942). In that case,
the F.D.I.C. brought suit on a note which it had
acquired an asset from collateral for a loan made to
a state bank. The defense of want of consideration
was asserted, but the parties could not agree on
which state law was to be applied to the transaction,
it being alleged that under Missouri law the defense
was proper, while under Illinois law the defendant
would be estopped to deny liability on this ground.
The Supreme Court held that the matter was not a
question of state law, but of federal law. There
were two reasons for this result. First, the
corporation was an agency of the federal
government and second, the policy underlying the
Federal Reserve Act to protect the assets of public
banks from misrepresentation required the questions
presented to be determined by federal standards.
Here the receiver, while not a federal corporation, is
an officer of a federal court appointed because of
violations of federal law. The policy underlying the
federal Securities Act of 1933 is to protect investors
from the fraudulent sale of securities and the
common loss of investment which follows from
violations of the act. In unsnarling the tangled
affairs of these corporations to preserve insofar as
possible assets for distribution to the defrauded
investors, the receiver is performing a federal
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function. These are substantial reasons for applying
a federal rule of decision to this case.151
The federal interest in the Ponzi receiver context is made clear. According to
Bryan, the federal interest is the vindication of investors defrauded from the Ponzi
scheme operators’ violations of the Securities Acts. In this respect, the Receiver serves
an important federal function and purpose by enforcing the Securities Acts through the
Court’s ancillary powers. In essence, the receiver is made a quasi-federal agent whose
authority is derived from the Securities Acts. This analogy conforms neatly to the
“federal source of power” and “frustration of purpose” propositions described in
Clearfield Trust.
The degree to which the federal purpose would be exacerbated is not directly
considered but assumed in Bryan. However, the discussion from the preceding section
clearly reveals the receiver’s practical barriers resulting from the adoption of conflicting
state fraudulent conveyance law and state veil-piercing doctrines. Considering the
implications of these factors, a serious “frustration of federal purpose” under Kimbell’s
two pronged inquiry with respect to uniformity can be established.
a. Applying Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Rule
The need for a federal rule of law in this case far outweighs a state’s reliance or
interest in fraudulent conveyance law. In the Ponzi scheme context, the reliance is
irrelevant since a state’s interest in imposing fraudulent conveyance law is related to a
debtor’s attempt to hide or divert assets from her creditors.152 In a Ponzi scheme, the
transfers are paid as fictitious “profit” distributions and, though fraudulent, are not made
with the specific intent to defraud creditors through the diversion of assets. Rather, the
transfers are made to show large returns on principal investments in order to deceive and
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lure new investors so the scheme may continue. Applying a uniform federal rule to this
context has no implication upon or binding effect on debtor transactions aimed at
defrauding creditors. Arguably, it is irrelevant to a state’s reliance on fraudulent
conveyance law. Therefore, Kimbell’s concerns with the displacement of state law are
not applicable in this context and a uniform federal rule may be applied substantively.
The question then becomes what fraudulent transfer rule should be adopted as a
uniform federal rule. The use of uniform statutes as federal common law has often been
held appropriate to displace state law.153 One aspect to consider in this determination is
which uniform law has been adopted by most states.154 In the past, federal courts have
applied the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA) as federal common law.155
Currently, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA) has replaced the UFCA and has
been adopted by forty-two states and the District of Columbia.156 In the receivership
context, it is reasonable to consider the UFTA as a national standard.157
The language of the UFTA is considerably favorable for the receiver. Most
significantly, the UFTA shifts the burden of having to prove valuable consideration of the
investor in good faith by the receiver to having the investor prove valuable consideration.
Furthermore, since transfers made as part of a Ponzi scheme are presumed to be
fraudulent, it is very difficult for an investor to prove that a fictitious “profit” distribution
is not made with the intent to defraud. Assuming valuable consideration is proved on the
part of an investor, it will only allow for the retention of the principle investment and not
any profits received. This tilts the balance of litigation considerably in favor of the
receiver. As a result, once it can be shown that investors have received funds in excess of
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their principle investments from a Ponzi operation, investors will be more likely to settle
their disputes than to litigate.
b. Federal Veil-Piercing Doctrine
Additionally, where a violation of a federal statute benefits a corporation, veil
piercing under federal common law may be appropriate.158 Not only do violations of the
Securities Acts benefit the offshore corporation by allowing it to profit from fraudulent
transfers as part of a Ponzi operation, but primarily the single or majority shareholder
benefits from the violations as an alter ego. In other words, acceptance of funds from the
Ponzi scheme can be construed as tortuous acts falling outside of the corporate function
to aide in violations of the Acts.
It is firmly established that a domestic shareholder of a foreign corporation may
be held liable for an act done by the corporation under the laws of the United States.159 It
is also well settled that “a state may impose liability upon a shareholder of a foreign
corporation [under the state’s law] for an act done by the corporation in the state, if the
state’s relationship to the shareholder is sufficient to make reasonable the imposition of
such liability upon him.160 In First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior
De Cuba, the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned:
As a general matter, the law of the state of incorporation normally
determines issues relating to the internal affairs of a corporation.
Application of that body of law achieves the need for certainty and
predictability of result while generally protecting the justified expectations
of parties with interests in the corporation. (citation omitted) Different
conflicts principles apply, however, where the rights of third parties
external to the corporation are at issue. (citation omitted) To give
conclusive effect to the law of the chartering state in determining whether
the separate juridical status of its instrumentality should be respected
would permit the state to violate with impunity the rights of third parties
under international law while effectively insulating itself from liability in
foreign courts.161
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Whether to impose liability upon a foreign corporation under foreign law or U.S.
State law is clear within the context of an “external” claim filed by a third party. The
language of First Nat’l Bank can and has been used against foreign corporations to
protect victims of torts committed by the corporation within the state under state law.162
Federal Courts have generally considered fraudulent transfers to be torts.163 The
application of a federal common law rule in such a case does not necessarily run the risk
of creating precedent which will subvert substantive state corporate law by the imposition
of federal law nor will it thwart any other federal policy if the transfer is considered a tort
committed against the Ponzi corporation. The action is “external” and beyond the scope
of the corporate charter or an ultra vires act.164
Arguably, a shareholder does rely significantly upon the veil-piercing doctrine of
the state in which they are incorporated. However, in determining whether to disregard
the corporate entity, “[t]he strength of the particular federal interest violated must be
weighed, not only against state corporate law, but also against other federal policies that
may be implicated.”165 This analysis allows the court to serve as a sort of “gatekeeper”
that balances the equities in determining whether to allow a veil-piercing to proceed
under federal standards. It also conforms with the standards of Kimbell.
As discussed earlier, veil-piercing doctrines vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
with some being more stringent than others. It is conceivable for one jurisdiction to
allow piercing of an offshore entity to reach a shareholder that has received fraudulent
transfers as part of a Ponzi scheme while another jurisdiction will maintain the integrity
of the corporate form.166 The dangers of Clearfield Trust in “making identical

37

transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several states”167 is evident. The
federal common law standard for piercing the corporate veil is then appropriate.
The federal common law veil piercing doctrine perhaps provides the least
cumbersome and surmountable method for reaching an offshore shareholder in the Ponzi
scheme context. It also provides the most uniform approach for the receiver when
dealing with such entities. The federal doctrine establishes a two pronged balancing test
to determine whether the veil should be pierced.168 The first prong asks whether there is
“such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation
and the individual no longer exist.”169 The second prong must assess whether an
“inequitable result will follow ‘if the acts are treated as those of the corporation
alone.’”170
It is presumable that a single shareholder of the entire stock or majority holder of
an offshore corporation receiving fraudulent transfers in their entirety on behalf of the
entity receives the full benefit of those transfers. It can easily be said that the shareholder
has a unity of interest with the corporation. The difficulty under state law comes when an
individual invests on behalf of the corporation as an “employee” of the corporation in the
Ponzi operation. It becomes especially difficult when the offshore corporation is engaged
in other legitimate business activity managed by the majority shareholder and is not
established merely as a “shell” corporation. The federal common law doctrine is
arguably a more relaxed standard and would still allow the veil to be pierced in such a
context (where the offshore entity is engaged in a legitimate enterprise) if there is a
minimal showing of the first factor.
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As for the second prong, the burden placed on the receiver of acquiring
jurisdiction over the offshore corporation and the very real possibility that a domestic
judgment against the corporation will not be enforced abroad certainly qualify as
“inequitable results” in the event the veil is not pierced. The prospect speaks heavily in
favor of piercing and while there may be only a minimal finding of “unity of interest,”
the presence of a federal interest, that being the enforcement of the Securities Act by
recovering lost investor funds to the Ponzi scheme, could tilt the balance towards
piercing.
2. The Case of Terry v. June
While the language of Bryan was dicta,171 it proved persuasive for a federal court
in the Western District of Virginia exercising ancillary jurisdiction over the disgorgement
proceedings of a receiver appointed by the SEC to recover false profits made as part of a
multinational Ponzi scheme.172 The facts of Terry v. June173 are unprecedented and truly
reflect the “post-Erie survival of a ‘federal common law.’”174
Roy M. Terry and the law firm of DurretteBradshaw were appointed as Receivers
over a fraudulent Bahamian corporation, “Vavasseur,” developed and marketed as an
investment and trading program.175 The program was orchestrated and operated mainly
by a Terry L. Dowdell.176 Over a period of approximately four years, Dowdell managed
to lure investors with promises of high rates of return (as high as 160 percent of principle
investment) in the form of “profit” distributions.177 In fact, Dowdell paid these “profit”
distributions to investors with funds he and his associates solicited from newer
investors.178 No money was ever actually invested in any sort of venture.179 The scheme,
which initially began in Florida and later moved to Virginia, was entirely fraudulent.180
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Ultimately, the SEC and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) discovered and shut down
the operation.181 The scheme attracted investors from no fewer than 26 states and foreign
countries182 and managed to generate in excess of $121 million.183
Robert June, Sr., a Michigan resident, was one of many investors involved in
Dowdells’ program.184 June’s son, Robert June, Jr., was an employee of Dowdell who
managed his father’s investments.185 Following the collapse of the scheme, the law firm
of DurretteBradshaw filed action in federal district court against June, Sr. to recover
funds as Receivers (hereinafter “Receivers”) of Vavasseur.186 The Receiver alleged June
had received “substantial earnings” on his investment which were in reality merely the
funds of later investors in Dowdell’s scheme.187 The Court maintained supplemental
jurisdiction over the case because it was ancillary to the SEC’s main case against
Dowdell.188
After filing a complaint against June, the Receiver moved for summary judgment
against June.189 At issue was which state fraudulent conveyance law would be applicable
to the case.190 Though the scheme and program were operated mainly from two states,
Florida and Virginia, Virginia being the state where Dowdell solicited June as an
investor, the Court concluded that the UFTA was applicable under federal common
law.191 The Court reasoned:
[T]he present case...[is] one of those limited
instances where the application of federal common
law is appropriate, because there is a significant
conflict between the federal interests involved and
the application of state law. First, there is a strong
need for uniformity in the treatment of the
Receiver's various claims against those who
allegedly received fraudulent transfers from the
Dowdell fraud scheme. There is a federal interest in
the consistent enforcement of the federal securities
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laws, in which the Receiver's asset recovery efforts
play a significant role. The Receiver has represented
-- and the defendant has not disputed -- that the
scope of the fraud includes no fewer than 26 states
and foreign countries. Of the many individuals
around the world who made similar investments in
the same investment program, and who received
fictitious profits in return, it would be unfair and
illogical to allow some of those investors to retain
their profits while forcing others to disgorge theirs.
Yet that is the possible result of applying the laws
of different states and nations to the Receiver's
various suits.
Second, the application of varying state and foreign
laws could frustrate the objectives of the Receiver,
which are federal in character, namely the
protection of investors from the fraudulent sale of
securities by recovering assets for distribution to the
victim investors. The application of Virginia's
fraudulent conveyance law could make the recovery
of assets more difficult in this case, because it
seems to set a higher bar than does the UFTA for
setting aside fraudulent conveyances. (citation
omitted) Moreover, the lack of a nationwide
common law rule could subject the Receiver to
additional litigation over the proper law to apply in
different cases. The Receiver's additional expenses
would be paid from funds that would otherwise be
returned to the fraud victims, hindering the federal
interest in maximum compensation for the victims
of securities fraud.
The need for uniformity and the objective of asset
recovery, by themselves, may not be sufficient
grounds for applying federal common law. (citation
omitted) This case, however, also involves
securities regulation -- an area governed by federal
laws that are enforced in federal courts by a federal
agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The Receiver here is performing federal functions.
(citation omitted) He was appointed by a federal
court; his powers are governed by the court order
and by federal statutes. (citations omitted) The
Receiver's efforts are an integral adjunct to the
SEC's enforcement of the federal securities laws.
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The federal securities statutes confer upon district
courts broad equitable powers to fashion
appropriate remedies, including the appointment of
a receiver, to effectuate the purposes of the
securities laws. (citation omitted) The Magistrate
Judge's order of July 12, 2002 authorizes the
Receiver to take necessary measures, including the
bringing of legal actions, to prevent the dissipation
of any receivership assets. The collection of these
assets for their eventual disbursement to the fraud
victims is a federal interest, which the court finds to
be in conflict with the potential application of
diverse state (and foreign) laws.192

III.

Conclusion
The facts of a multinational or multi-state Ponzi scheme are generally very

unique. The application of federal common law to ensure the uniformity of outcomes
and to ensure the quick resolution of ancillary claims resulting from the fraud perpetrated
against innocent investors in a multi-jurisdictional Ponzi scheme is not only warranted
under such narrow circumstances but, arguably, is necessary to effectively accomplish
the federal purpose for which the receiver is appointed. It is not uncommon to look to the
spirit and purpose of the Securities Acts when unusual circumstances arise threatening
the average investor and the general integrity of the securities market.193
Ponzi schemes should be of particular concern when considering such potential
harm. The seemingly attractive and lucrative appearance of a Ponzi operation is
especially alluring to unsophisticated investors seeking a generous return on their
investment. Since Ponzi schemes are destined to collapse, a cost effective and time
efficient process should be in place to allow for the maximum recovery of lost funds.
Indeed, this is the goal and purpose in appointing a receiver over collapsed entities
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operating such fraudulent programs. Decreasing the time and cost of the receiver’s
litigation certainly accomplishes this goal. Permitting the receiver to benefit from the
adoption of a uniform fraudulent conveyance law under federal common law principles
and also allowing a federal common law veil piercing standard in actions against
investors that have received fraudulent transfers on behalf of wholly owned offshore
corporations goes far in accomplishing this task by setting a uniform standard to apply in
the various disgorgement actions they must commence against entities which have
profited from ill-gotten gains.
Conversely, Court’s should be concerned with the precedent that is established if
uniform rules are not adopted under federal common law. The variance in fraudulent
conveyance law admittedly will frustrate uniformity for the receiver bringing civil
ancillary actions against Ponzi scheme investors. A very real consequence of applying
different state fraudulent conveyance laws to essentially the same proceedings will be, in
the words of Terry, “unfair and illogical” since it would “allow some... investors to retain
their profits while forcing other to disgorge theirs.” Furthermore, the burden placed on
the receiver in resolving conflicts of law only increases the cost of the receiver’s
litigation which is paid from recovered investor funds.
Another consequence, with respect to investors of offshore entities, may be an
indication to shareholders of such offshore corporations that there is unwillingness in
federal court’s to hold individual shareholders liable through federal common law if there
is a conflict with state corporate law. Indirect insiders who benefit from such schemes
can often be out of reach from prosecution by the SEC. As a result, they would have an
added wall of protection in setting up offshore entities if they could avoid civil liability
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by making litigation timely and expensive for the receiver by operating in a state with lax
veil piercing laws and by lengthening the time to serve process on these entities. Such an
outcome would frustrate the goal of the receiver by making disgorgement proceedings
difficult, timely and expensive and could even discourage their prosecution.
The receivership in the Ponzi scheme context clearly illustrates the necessity of
federal common law. The purpose of judge-made law is to intervene where statutes fail
to address clear injustice and a legislature cannot act soon enough to remedy that
injustice. The dangers in usurping a state legislature’s authority in such a narrow context
seem nonexistent. Federal common law exists and must exist to displace the inequities
which arise, and to address the unavoidable conflicts, within a system of government
interconnected with other smaller governments. Furthermore, the need for more flexible
and malleable principles of federal common law are arguably necessary in the global
business context to maintain the integrity of federal policy and purpose in the face of
competing foreign law as is illustrated above.
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